This study empirically extends the Tiebout hypothesis of 'voting with one's feet' in two ways. First, it provides updated estimates using net migration data for the period 2000-2008. Second, in addition to investigating variables reflecting public education outlays, property taxation and income taxation, it investigates whether migrants are attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits per recipient. The latter hypothesis is referred to as the 'Medicaid magnet hypothesis'. The analysis includes three economic variables, three quality of life variables and three Tiebout-type factors in addition to Medicaid benefits. Empirical results indicate that consumer voters were attracted to states with higher per pupil public school spending, lower property and income tax rates, and that certain consun1er-voters may be attracted to states that offer higher levels of Medicaid benefits.
I. Introduction
Determinants of U.S. internal migration are a topic of significant research interest as evidenced by Percy et al. (1995) ; Saltz (1998); Milligan (2000) ; Houtenville (2001, 2003) , Knapp et al. (2001) ; Rhode and Strumpf (2003) ; Chi and Voss (2005) ; Cebula and Alexander (2006) ; Francis (2007) ; Landry et al. (2007) , and Kennan and Walker (2010) .
One of the migration issues receiving the greatest attention involves the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis, sometimes referred to as either the Tiebout-Tullock hypothesis, or simply 'voting with one's feet'. It was hypothesized by Tiebout (1956, p. 418 ) that 'the consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that community which best satisfies his preferences for public goods ... the consumer-voter 1noves to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences'. Tullock (1971, p. 917) observes that this hypothesis can be extended such that the 'individual deciding where to live will take into account the private effects upon himself of the bundle of government services and taxes'. Thus, Tullock (197l) , perhaps more expressly than Tiebout (1956) , emphasizes that the consumer-voter evaluates both the government goods and services and the tax burden at potential end locations of choice.
This study extends the Tiebout hypothesis in two ways. It provides updated estimates using net migration data for the period 2000-2008 and in addition to investigating variables reflecting per pupil public education outlays, effective property tax rates and effective income tax rates, it investigates whether migrants are *Corresponding author. E-mail: J-Clark@utc.edu 4575 attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits per recipient. We refer to this behaviour as the 'Medicaid magnet hypothesis'. States with higher Medicaid benefits per recipient attract persons who·either are already receiving Medicaid, who are Medicaid-eligible or expect to become Medicaid-eligible in the foreseeable future. These states act like magnets to the Medicaid constituency and induce an influx of migrants. State governments offering higher Medicaid benefit levels per recipient inay also be preventing out-1nigration
from their own state of residents who are either already receiving Medicaid benefits, are Medicaid-eligible or expect to become Medicaid-eligible. The Medicaid magnet hypothesis and the empirical investigation thereof are 1 notivated in part by the observation noted by Holahan (2007, p. 667 ) that 'There is great variation among states in Medicaiq _spending per lowincome person', a fact documented some time ago by Holahan and Liska (1997) . Moreover, this extension of the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis can be regarded as something of a derivative of the debate regarding welfare migration in Sommers and Suits (1973); Paek (1973) ; Glantz (l 974); Southwick (1981) ; Cebula and Belton (1994) ; Levine and Zi1mnerman (J 999) , and Kennan and Walker (2010) . This contemporary study of the Medicaid magnet hypothesis extension adopts state-level data for the United States and deals with net state in-migration rate detern1inants for the period 20002008. The adoption of state-level data, as opposed to city-or county-level data, to investigate the Tiebout hypothesis follows previous studies (Cebula and Belton, 1994; Saltz, 1998; Gale and Heath, 2000; Conway and Houtenville, 2001; Cebula and Alexander, 2006; Kennan and Walker, 2010) .
Numerous studies have empiricalJy addressed determinants of U.S. internal migration. A number of these studies emphasize the migration impact not only of economic and fiscal factors but also 'quality of life' factors, as in Saltz (1998); Conway and Houtenville (1998 , 2003 , Gale and Heath (2000) ; Milligan (2000) ; Knapp et al. (2001) , and Cebula and Alexander (2006) . As demonstrated in these studies, the omission of noneconomic factors fro1n an empirical inigration analysis constitutes an omitted-variable problem that generally compromises the integrity of that analysis. As a consequencei our current article includes not only fiscal factors and purely economic factors but also a number of quality of life/ a1nenity factors.
II. Framework
The consumer-voter is treated as viewing the migration decision as an investment decision such that the decision R. j. Cebula and f . R. Clark to migrate from area i to area j requires that his/her expected net discounted present value of migration from area i to area}, DPVij, be both (a) positive and (b) the maximum net discounted present value that can be expected from moving fron1 area i to any other known and plausible alternative area U). Because of the fact that this study uses net state in-migration, issues such as distance and moving costs are obviously 01nitted fro1n the computation of the DPVij.
Accordingly, following the models in Tiebout (1956); Tullock (1971) ; Riew (1973) ; Renas (1983); Vedder et al. (1986) , and Cebula and Alexander (2006) , among others, DPVij consists in this study of three broad sets of considerations, namely
(1) Economic conditions in those areas (2) Fiscal factors in those areas (3) Quality oflife factors in those areas Logically, migration will flow from area ito areaj only if To measure the migration rate, M!Gj, the net number of in-migrants to statej over the period July 2000-July 2008 expressed as apercent of the year 2000 population in state j, is adopted. A positive (negative) net in-migration indicates that more (fewer) migrants entered the state than left the state during the time frame studied. Since this study provides an estimate in semi-log form as well as estimates in linear form, the dependent variable (net in-migration) is, in the semi-log estimate, expressed as follows: first, the net number of in-migrants to each state over the period July 2000-July 2008 is divided by tbe population in each state for the year 2000; second, that figure, which is a decimal with a value between -LO and +1.0, depending upon the state, is added to +1 .0 in order to guarantee a positive value for the net in-migration rate for each of the states; finally, the resulting figure is converted to a percent and tben into natural log fonn.
To ineasure economic conditions in state ), three variables are adopted, altbough, technically, the first variable listed below integrates two typically separated economic variables;
(1) EMFIN CJ is the year 2000 nominal median family income in state), MFJNCj, multiplied by ( l-UNj), where UNj is the unemployment rate of the civilian labour force in the year 2000 in statej, expressed as a decimal; thus, (1-UNj) is tile employment rate of the civilian labour force in state j (expressed as a decimal) and the product of MFINCj and (1-UNj), EMFINCj, is treated as a measure of expected family income/wage prospects in state j insofar as it includes not only a measure of income in each state but also the probability of obtaining a job in each state (Saltz, 1998) ; in any case, net in-migration is expected to be an increasing function of EMFINCj. (2SLS) is the estimation technique adopted in this study. The inclusion of a variable such as EMPLGRj is based on Vedder et al. (1986) and Cebula and Alexander (2006) , where net in-n1igration is found to be an increasing function of
EMPGRj.
To measure fiscal factors, four variables are adopted, one of which reflects the Medicaid magnet extension to the Tiebout hypothesis:
(1) EFSINCTXRATEJ is the year 2000 average effective percentage state inconJ.e tax rate in state j, which over the years has often been overlooked, although it has been taken into consideration more recently by Cebula (1990) ; Gale and Heath (2000) , and Conway and Houtenville (1998 , 2003 . Conventional wisdom (Riew, 1973 ) would argue that a higher level of EFSINCTXRATEj would be expected to discourage net in-migration.
(2) EFPROPTXRATE j, the average effective property tax rate in statej, i.e., the average effective city plus county property tax rate in state/ in the year 2000. Some measure of property taxes has previously been considered by Liu (1977) ; Gale and Heath (2000) ; Conway and Houtenville (2001) ; Rhode and Strumpf (2003) , and Cebula and Alexander (2006) in tbc migration studies of a Tiebout-type framework, altbough usually in tbe form of per capita property taxes. Based on the conventional wisdom (Riew, 1973) , a higher property tax rate (EFPROPTXRATEj ) is expected to dissuade net inmigration.
(3) The variable PPUP!Lj is tbe nominal outlay in state j per pupil on primary and secondary public education in the year 2000. PPUP!Lj replaces tbe more commonly adopted variable per capita public education outlays examined by Pack (1973) ; Cebula (1979) ; Renas (1980) ; Houtenville (1998, 2001 ), Gale and Heatb (2000) , and Rhode and Stnnnpf (2003) Finally, to measure quality of life conditions, tbe focus is on tbe following three variables:
(1) JANTEMPJ is the mean January temperature in state j (l971-2000), as a measure of warmer climatic conditions in state j. As in so many migration studies, including Clark and Hunter (1992) ; Houtenville (1998, 2001 ); Gale and Heath (2000) , and Cebula and Alexander (2006) , tbis variable or a close substitute for the san1e, such as heating degree days, is adopted as a quality of life control variable for climate. It is expected tbat a warmer climate is likely to increase the net inflow of migrants.
(2) COASI] is a dununy variable to reflect whetber state j directly borders on eitber tbe Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico or the Pacific Ocean. COASI] 1 if state j borders on one or more of tbese bodies of water and COASTj = 0 otherwise. The expected in1pact of this variable on net in-1nigration is positive (Cebula and Alexander, 2006) . (3) DENSITY} is the population density in statej, measured as the nu1nber of persons per square 1nile in state j in tbe year 2000. To tbe extent that greater population density implies greater crowding and congestion, it is expected that net in-1nigration is a decreasing function of DENSITY;' (Cebula and Alexander, 2006) .
Based on the arguments in the previous section, the fOllowing coefficient signs (ceteris paribus ) are hypothesized:
Ill. The Migration Model
Based upon the eclectic model developed in the preceding section, the reduced-fonn equations to be estimated initially are given by Equations 2 and 3:
where lnM!Gj the natural log of MJGj; a 0 , b 0 constant te1n1s; u, u ' = stochastic error te1ms.
The study includes all 50 states. The expression of the exp1ar1atory variables (other than EMPLG.Rj ) in year 2000 levels is based on Greenwood (1978) , who argues that use of beginning-of-period values for right-hand-side variables helps to avoid simultaneity bias. The data sources for all of the variables in the analysis are provided in Table 1. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics. Table 3 provides a correlation matrix for the explanatory variables, where serious multicollinearity problems are not evident. 
Given that the net migration variable M!Gj and the explanatory variable EMPLGRj are contemporaneous in this specification, the possibility of simultaneity bias (twoway causality) clearly exists (Liu, 1977; Greenwood, l 978; Partridge and Rickman, 2006) . Accordingly, the model is to be estimated by 2SLS. The instrument for the EMPLGRj variable (which refers to the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] is the previous-period (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) percentage growth rate of employment in nonfarm establishments in state j, PREVEMPLGPRj. The choice of instrument is based on the findings that it is highly correlated with the explanatory variable, EMPLGPRj, while being uncorrelated with the error terms in the system.
IV. Initial Estimations
The 2SLS estimations of Equations 2 and 3 are provided in columns (a) and (b), respectively, of Table 4 . In column (a), all ten of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with five statistically significant at the 1% level, two statistically significant at the 2.5% level, and three statistically significant at the 5% level. In addition, the F-statistic is significant at the 2.5% level, an indication of the overall strength of the model. In estimate (b), all ten of the estimated coefficients once again exhibit the hypothesized signs, with four statistically significant at the I % level, two statistically significant at the 2.5% level, three statistically significant at the 5% level and one statistically significant at beyond the I 0% level. The F-statistic is significant at the 2.5% level in this esti1nate, once again reflecting the strength of the model.
The estimated coefficient on the incon1e variable (EA1FllVC) is positive and statistically significant at beyond the 2.5% level in both estimates (a) and (b). In addition, the estimated coefficient on the cost of living variable (COSI) is negative and statistically significant at the l % level in both estimates (a) and (b). Combined, these results iinply that the net state in-migration rate was an increasing function of no1ninaJ expected median family income and a decreasing function of the overall cost of living. These results conform to the 'conventional wisdon1' and imply that migrants (consumer-voters) prefer higher income locations and manifest an aversion to states having higher living-cost levels. Jn addition, the attractive to migrants. Next, the estiinated coefficients on the COAST dummy variable are both positive, with that in estimation (a) being statistically significant at the 5% level and that in estimation (b) being statistically significant at 6o/ o level. These results imply that consumer-voters appear to prefer living in states v1 ,1ith greater closeness/access to either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans or the Gulf of Mexico. The estimated coefficients on the DENSITY variable in estimates (a) and (b) are both negative and statistically significant at the 5o/ o level. Thus, consumer-voters may have an aversion to states having a higher population density. Lastly\ we consider the results for the variables reflecting our expanded interpretation of the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis.
The coefficient on the variable EFSJNCTXRATE) is negative in both estimates and statistically significant at the l % level in estimate (a) and at the 2.5o/o level in esti1nate (b). Thusi consumer-voters appear to have an aversion to higher state personal income tax rate levels. In addition, the estiinated coefficient on the variable PPUPJLj is positjve and statistically significant at the 5°/o level in both estimates. Hence\ consumer-voters appear to prefer locating in states committing greater financial resources per pupil to prin1ary and secondary public education. This 'appreciation' for public education prioritization could reflect expected direct benefits (for parents with school-age children) and/or an awareness of the positive externalities of education. Next\ the coefficient on the property tax variable, EFPROPTXRATE), is negative and statistically significant at the l % level in both estimates, implying that consun1er-voters prefer residence in states with lower Notes: Terms in parentheses are t-values. ***, ** and * statistically significant at the I %, 2.5% and 6'o/t1 levels, respectively; #statistically significant at the 10% level.
effective property tax rates. All of these 'updated' results are generally consistent \Vith most of the other prior/earlier related studies of the Tiebout (1956) framework. Finally, there is the case of the variable MEDICAJDPR. In estimation (a), the coefficient on 1his variable is positive and statistically significant at the 2.5% level, whereas it is positive and statistically significant at just beyond the 5170 level in estirnation (b). These results imply that some portion of consumer-voters, presumably higher 'at-risk' persons (health-wise), prefer to move to states where Medicaid benefits per recipient are higher.
Thus, there appears to be strong support for 1he Medicaid magnet extension of the Tiebout (1956) hypothesis.
V. Robustness Tests
To test the robustness of the basic model in Table 4 , two additional variables are included in the model in tvvo new
The 2SLS estimates of Equations 5 and 6 are provided in colunms (a) and (b), respectively, of Table 5 . Overall. 1hese two 2SLS estimates yield 23 coefficients. All of the esthnated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with 15 statistically significant at the I % level, two at the 2.5% level and five at the 5% level. Only one of the estimated coefficients (POLLUT]) fails to be statistically significant at the l 0% level. higher levels of econo1nic freedo1n do induce higher net in-1nigration,
As for the remaining variables in Table 5 , they are extremely close in both n1agnitude and statistical significance to their counterparts in Table 4 . Thus, the results from the estimation of Equation 2 in column (a) appear to be robust. In particular, based on the findings in Tables 4 and 5 Of greatest relevance to this study, the findings in Table 5 imply that the Tiebout (1956) 
VI. Conclusions
This study has investigated determinants of net in-1nigra-tion rates in the United States over the period 2000-2008, with the intentions of using contempora1y migration data to investigate the Tiebout (1956) Tables 144, 145) .
Using 2SLS estimation, initially a linear model is estimated and then a corresponding semi-log model is estimated (see Table 4 ). Both the linear and semi-log specifications allow for purely economic factors (including an index of the average overall cost of living ln each state), quality of life variables and Tiebout (1956) The results demonstrate that as conswner-voters 1nake migration decisions, they tend to move to states with higher per pupil outlays on public primary and secondary' education, with lower effective inco1ne tax rates and lower effective property tax rates. In addition, some portion of consu1ner-voters apparently is attracted to states with higher Medicaid benefits. Regarding the latter empirical findings invol ving the Medicaid magnet hypothesis and the case of the variables MEDJCAIDPR and MAXMEDICAJDPRj, in all of the 2SLS estimates, the estimated coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant. Thus, there Medicaid spending per recipient. The authors of the present study of the Medicaid magnet hypothesis concede potential benefits to a 'federal solution', presumably in the form of unifonn Medicaid benefits per low-income person nationally. However, it would be argued here that such a 'uniform' system might very welt_ require interstate Medicaid benefits to be adjusted to reflect either interstate cost-of-living differentials or interstate medical care price differentials in order to establish the equity in which Holahan (2007) is interested and in the elimination of the Medicaid magnet phenomenon with which the present study is concerned. Inother words, real Medicaid benefits potentially may have to be made approximately equal across the states in order to successfully address these concerns.
